Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)

Brothers (and Sisters too!) I would be lying if I said that recent exchanges on this forum on AMISOM Body-Count versus tactical strategy has not been fundamentally offensive to me. I disagree that we exercise a "choice" in matters of HONOR - this is an essential definition of who you are. Intellectual exchanges between us on subjects where effective strategy is accompanied by inevitable Body Count, we must not callously reduce both to mere statistical and comparative mentions - that is repugnant and dishonorable a debate that neither myself nor any Uniform will partake in.

I find it particularly offensive that debate is invited from an intention to manifest awareness of the subject - results of strategy as well as the efficiency of the strategy reflected on the Body Count. Let us discuss where we are / how we got there / the cost both material and human of how we there, with discipline with fervor even but WITHOUT dishonoring ourselves and our War Dead.

East Africans must prepare themselves for an increased attrition of our Soldiers and Civilian Populations as we move to the next phase - COIN Ops inside Zoomaliya and inside our homelands. On this forum, going forth in consequence to this, the nexus between the Uniforms and Civilians forummers (I dare say) ought to be lie as close to "that" LINE - honor and decorum.

Ama?

areba wrote:What about the Sea Knight? is it that its costly? or is it limited to a priviledged few? Dont know why but i find the twin rotor design of the same , or its elder brother a rather good engineering decision...

It depends on the mission; if you want to insert more than 8 Men/SF in a not so hot theater then the CH-46 Sea Knight is the way to go. But if the theater is hot, fire power and the element of surprise play a critical role making the CAH-24 Super Hind the best tool for the job.

The rotor design of this birds is not the same but it achieves the same objective the fundamental difference is the CH-46 rotor (Tandem rotors) does not use power to cancel torque from the main rotor (Both rotors are used to lift the bird) but the CAH-24 rotor uses some power to counter torque from the main rotor (The tail rotor is used to stabilize the bird) the advantage of using a tail rotor is a simpler transmission configuration as compared to the tandem rotors. The tail rotor design is good for maneuverability and speed but it requires a bigger power plant as compared to the tandem rotor design.
See the comparison below;

CH-46
Cost: $6 million as of 1987
Crew: 5: 2 pilots, 1 crew chief, 1 aerial gunner/observer, 1 tail gunner
Capacity: 25 troops
Max. takeoff weight: 24,300 lb (11,000 kg)
Powerplant: 2 × General Electric T58-GE-16 turboshafts, 1,870 shp (1,400 kW) each
Maximum speed: 166 mph (144 knots, 267 km/h)
Range: 633 mi (550 nmi, 1,020 km)
Guns: 2× Door mounted GAU-15/A .50 BMG (12.7 x 99 mm) machine guns (optional), 1 Ramp mounted M240D 7.62 x 51 mm machine gun (optional)

CAH-24 Super Hind
Cost: $40 Million (Canadian's got it for that much)
Capacity: 8 troops or 4 stretchers
Empty weight: 8,500 kg (18,740 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 12,000 kg (26,500 lb)
Powerplant: 2× Isotov TV3-117 turbines, 1,600 kW (2,200 hp) each
Maximum speed: 335 km/h (208 mph)
Range: 450 km (280 miles) on internal fuel
Flexible 25mm dual feed auto-cannon with 1200 (600/600) rounds of ammunition
2 x 7.62mm machine guns mounted on passenger compartment doors.
Bombs within weight range up to 500 kg.
MU90 Impact homing torpedoesCFGUV-8700 gunpod
UB-32 CRV7 rocket launchers
Quad pack: 9K121 Vikhr ATGW
Quad pack: Brimstone ATGW
Quad pack: Hellfire
Multi pack: 8 x CRV-7PG, 2 x Brimstone/Hellfire/9K121 Vikhr
Quad pack: 9K338 Igla-S AAMs
Quad pack: FIM-92A Stinger Blk II AAMs
Dual pack: Python-5 AAMs
Kh-25MP (AS-12 'Kegler')-all variants

At first we thought the statement by Ugandan Miniforex last week that Uganda was re-considering her Zoomaliya Deployment in light of the serious and spurious accusation by some Western busy bodies of her material support for the M23 brigands, was diplomatic posturing to leverage /blackmail the UNSC. NTypical of these reports on the DRC, obviously lacking facts and substance despite these reports being authored by bodies accredited to the UNSC.

But it is becoming apparent that M7 is deadly serious about this, justifiable very angry with the UNSC. A lot of worried Brass in kDoD.

What happens to AMISOM and Zoomaliya should UPDF pull out? Anyone wants to develop a working and realistic hypothesis?

ole Nkarei wrote:At first we thought the statement by Ugandan Miniforex last week that Uganda was re-considering her Zoomaliya Deployment in light of the serious and spurious accusation by some Western busy bodies of her material support for the M23 brigands, was diplomatic posturing to leverage /blackmail the UNSC. NTypical of these reports on the DRC, obviously lacking facts and substance despite these reports being authored by bodies accredited to the UNSC.

But it is becoming apparent that M7 is deadly serious about this, justifiable very angry with the UNSC. A lot of worried Brass in kDoD.

What happens to AMISOM and Zoomaliya should UPDF pull out? Anyone wants to develop a working and realistic hypothesis?

The UNSC made their bed, it's about time they lay in it. They have to decide whether Uganda is a responsible neighbour and partner or the bad boy of the region. And fast. I mean, that report does not even pass the common sense test. And how does someone become an 'expert' on the DRC or Kenya, for example? Just by having a PHD on the Great Lakes? Saw these leftie (read liberal) experts who authored the report fielding questions, some bookworms who looked in their thirties. Guess it's their kind that authored for us the copy and paste economic prescriptions of the 90s on behalf of the IMF.

Here is what I think would happen in the unlikely event that UPDF leaves Somalia. I am using the term 'unlikely' because I expect the UNSC to blink first;
1. KDF would become stretched, no doubt, because vital installations of the Somali government now being manned by UGABAG would have to be manned by KDF.
2. The Shabaab would be energised
3. Ethiopia would be drawn back into the fray, seeing as they don't want their backyard in Shabaab hands.

The rest would be determined by day to day events.

No worry guys, got feeling Burudi will fill the void left by departing UPDF just ok. I have no doubt about it. I also think we seem to forget about these guys, but I think they are fine soldiers. They seem to carry out most of dangerous tasks In Mogadishu; so I have no doubt about their abilities to step in. Also, I think AU will have many options should M7 make his wish right. The AMISOM can request any of AMISOM countries to increase their troops level without any difficult. Most would be happy to do so. So for M7, I am afraid his tricks may NOT work at this moment as it would have worked, say at begining of this mission in Somalia for ex.. The money is good for the soldiers who are serving in Somalia. They will not let politics ruin their cash flow and their families life back home

ON,

M7 is bluffing. AMISOM is a cash-cow . Only the other day they were trying to sneak in more troops than they are required to. He is not about to cut the hand that feeds him.

That having been said, the most obvious consequence of such unexpected selflessness from M7, would place the spotlight on KDF. Kenya, because of its strategic success in sector 2, would likely be asked to fill the void and more. Because AMISOM now appreciates the force multipliers that played a key role in sector 2. As a consequence you might see a few of Ahmed Madhobe's Swahili speaking "Somalis" in sector 1. Djibouti might also be asked to increase its contribution. A remote possibility is Tz being asked to join AMISOM.

My guess is that KDF will not budge from sector 2 a.k.a. Jubaland.
Remember the initial objective was to create a buffer zone shielding the
country. With Kismayu in the hands of friendlies, OLN is well on its way to being realised. It is my hope that it does not get to that coz God knows Somalia’s
need a stable country and shouldn’t have to pay for the mistakes of the so
called experts.


UPDF pulling out would have a counterproductive effect on
the whole region. It would eventually lead to Burundi pulling out too coz
honestly I don’t think they can hold out Mogadishu by their lone self. They
need armour for that unless they have brought it in since they first deployed.
The Al shabaab would be emboldened to fanatical levels. “The Mujahideen have
pushed the infidel baboons out through tactical deployment…..” Man, we would
never hear the end of all that bullshit.


Binging in another country to do it would take some time to
have them standing on their feet and mapping out the area all over again and I don’t
see it happening coz up to now when the going is considerably smooth they are
no jumping into the fray.


The one effect that I kinda see to be positive of the whole
thing is that the new government would have to man-up and grab their balls and do
something. They would have to stand up and be counted. Talk about baptism by
fire, jumping into the deep end of the pool. I think they can do it though they need some time to learn the
ropes.

Threatening to pull out of an objective that clearly says to the world that 1. Africans can solve their own problems 2. Somali's also deserve to live a life worth living, 3. We will not just stand and watch as the rest of the world has done, just because of a UN 'experts' report to me this is a clear indication of some level of political immaturity. I thought M7 went into som coz of clear conviction. Yes there are other benefits but then!!! This is another arm twist that thin tall one used some time back. It simply makes me reaffirm my stand that Ole man is the most politically mature c in c in the region. He stands even in the face of these international storms and stands out as a pan african. If M7 pulls out who will bear the brunt of the reaction? UNSC? No.

ole Nkarei wrote:At first we thought the statement by Ugandan Miniforex last week that Uganda was re-considering her Zoomaliya Deployment in light of the serious and spurious accusation by some Western busy bodies of her material support for the M23 brigands, was diplomatic posturing to leverage /blackmail the UNSC. NTypical of these reports on the DRC, obviously lacking facts and substance despite these reports being authored by bodies accredited to the UNSC.

But it is becoming apparent that M7 is deadly serious about this, justifiable very angry with the UNSC. A lot of worried Brass in kDoD.

What happens to AMISOM and Zoomaliya should UPDF pull out? Anyone wants to develop a working and realistic hypothesis?

personally I think that M7 and the old Man are in tango with whatever goes down in the region ie DRC and Somalia. We are in Somalia not because of the hot honeys from the region but because of Geo-political factors. Truth be told, it might not seem such a bad idea if M7 pulls out, Mogadishu will fall and the only peaceful sector will be the the south One which I am sure we can contain.

ole Nkarei wrote:At first we thought the statement by Ugandan Miniforex last week that Uganda was re-considering her Zoomaliya Deployment in light of the serious and spurious accusation by some Western busy bodies of her material support for the M23 brigands, was diplomatic posturing to leverage /blackmail the UNSC. NTypical of these reports on the DRC, obviously lacking facts and substance despite these reports being authored by bodies accredited to the UNSC.

But it is becoming apparent that M7 is deadly serious about this, justifiable very angry with the UNSC. A lot of worried Brass in kDoD.

What happens to AMISOM and Zoomaliya should UPDF pull out? Anyone wants to develop a working and realistic hypothesis?

i feel like the old wise man would have his jet fuelled and off to matoke/waragiville ASAP and work his magic..his main points would be tied to a more powerful kenyana especially as east africa has shown that it can solve its problems without external help,though i have a feeling that the UNSC has seen the potential of the world being run from kenyana region,from military ops to peace talks to being the next frontier in energy sources to industrial revolutio. so his pitch would be..lets show them what we can do in this region,and we would be untouchable.

Why Museveni is threatening to pull his troops out of Somalia is something that will manifest soon. UNDP_UNMSOA has it's audit on AMISOM progress in Somalia.

M23 and Kony besides the significant love the West had for Museveni may herald a new frontier for sabotage of AMISOM gains.

Museveni may not have understood how the West is good at playing roulette and toss you to the gutter when your services are nolonger needed.

Another issue is the lack of positive reviews about Uganda's efforts in Somalia by UNSC besides relevant authorities including international media.

The fall of Kismayu which was supposed to be a joint operation and it's geopolitical impact/media hype only obscures UPDF hard work.

Museveni is aware of the AMISOM mandate ends in days and having started it; bears the greatest responsibility in ensuring his troops have procured the desired results based on their initial principal objective.
However alot of wheeldealing is in progress and soon Museveni will be happy.
Somalia needs stability and UPDF has a responsibility to complete their mission in Somalia.

The withdrawal of UPDF troops by m7 could present a catastrophic turn of events, for all sectors in somalia work in tandem with each other... the an untimely withdrawal of UPDF would create a vacuum that other AMISOM players might experience challenges that will only create an opportunity for AS...this would affect sector 2 and the new somali government.. everything that AMISOM has worked on would experience a domino effect on political and social lives of the somali people.. they'd loose hope in AMISOM for it is the only force that has established a rapport with the people of somalia... i just hope that M7 can look at the bigger picture. AMISOM is the last hope for somalia and the key unifying factor of Kenyana.. my 2cnts

SS Jamuhuri wrote:The withdrawal of UPDF troops by m7 could present a catastrophic turn of events, for all sectors in somalia work in tandem with each other... the an untimely withdrawal of UPDF would create a vacuum that other AMISOM players might experience challenges that will only create an opportunity for AS...this would affect sector 2 and the new somali government.. everything that AMISOM has worked on would experience a domino effect on political and social lives of the somali people.. they'd loose hope in AMISOM for it is the only force that has established a rapport with the people of somalia... i just hope that M7 can look at the bigger picture. AMISOM is the last hope for somalia and the key unifying factor of Kenyana.. my 2cnts

We have to realise that it's the technocrats that have had a say up to this point. M7 hasn't had anything to say about the whole hullabaloo. So those of you here whoa are refering to the 'maturity' of CiCs in this region, or lack thereof, may be getting ahead of yourselves.

I think by now it really ought to clear to everyone that M7 is probably the most gifted and astute tactical master strategist of Kenyana political class. The Old Warrior knows the players intimately and the playfield. Some of the rules in play HE wrote or helped to write. So, the Western Powers at best can only be using as much or more as M7 is using them.

U GOTTA LOVE THESE OLD CLIPS.
KENYA FOR LIFE
EAST AFRICA FOR LIFE.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=N3THr9PN1xs

Unfortunately, the whole thing about pulling troops out of Mogadishu is not about the M23 rebels and Museveni's threat to pull out of Mugadishu is water under the bridge.

United Nations reports show Museveni has been assuming a very strong role in Somalia and has severally threatened to pull out his troops.

He threatened the Somali government itself.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-7527519.php?print=true

Uganda seems recently to have assumed a strong leadership role on Somalia. At a meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia on 2 and 3 June Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni reportedly threatened that Uganda would pull out its troops from Mogadishu if the Somali parties did not come to an agreement. (There are currently approximately 5,000 Ugandan peacekeepers in Mogadishu and they are a critical component of the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM.)

As such as i earlier projected, there are a myriad of reasons a man like Museveni may have considered before issuing this threat.
Rwanda did the same in Sudan after a similar UN report, the UN came home......playing down....putting out the fire.
Museveni is using the same strategy.

Museveni's role in Central Africa is not news and should be condemned, but the big question is 'WHY' he and Kagame are doing this.

However, this circe spell only draws out the complex web of intelligence-military strategies all for geopolitical gains.
For example....HOW CAN Uganda SO SUCCESSFULLY WORK TOGETHER WITH RWANDA TO DESTABILIZE DRC? WHEREAS KONY HAS KILLED MORE PEOPLE IN UGANDA THAN AL-SHABAAB YET HE HAS BECOME ELUSIVE ENOUGH TO RENDER AMERICAN COMMANDOS AND UPDF SOLDIERS INCAPABLE OF ARRESTING HIM?

Common sense is very common

Ole Nkarei and Spartan should answer this question

Why is UPDF and American Commandos working along the Ugandans not deployed in all areas where the LRA operates, such as the Vakaga Prefecture in the Central African Republic in the northeastern part of the Central African Republic?

LRA Bases and leaders including Kony are based at the Vakaga Prefecture in the Central African Republic.
UPDF and Uganda intelligence have this intelligence and have only leaked it rather than deploy forces there.??

why do i have this feeling that Uganda knows where to find Kony, and or is actually in touch with him!?

I stand to be corrected by our Ugandan Brigade - Aggressor One, Flying Crane, Soartan, etc.. When the LRA was "internationalized" and allowed to operate with substantial freedom outside Uganda, the entire game changed. Inside Uganda it was always possible to annihilate the LRA.

Anyone who has ever been to what is now apparently Joseph Tony's operating theater will have not one doubt the enormity of the task of finding and neutralizing him - a terrain of such hostility it drives you crazy after a week of continuous deployment.

Then add to the fact that Kony has a mere company-size of fighters left, who have grown up learning survival and practicing survival in this terrain every minute of their lives. He has strewn his men over an expansive area crossing into several countries and in tactical sizes of five men living off this land. And has terrorized host community that in consequence integrate Kony and his men.

The man has modern comms supplied by Western Conglomerates and their agents who deal in the international commodities market who have activate and supported Kony over the years.

Kony avoids armed contact like the plague, going to ground and staying down. He pillages and loots, killing his way across this vast terrain, pryng on the ethnic tensions prevalent in these simple tribes.

As the Americans have discovered, this Joseph Kony mambo is one very complex conundrum. Don't be too hasty to vilify ongoing initiatives against Kony.

There are two uncontested facts about the UPDF contingent in Somalia
a.) They are doing a fine job under very difficult conditions
b.) The UPDF contingent is going nowhere, there are many things which remain unattended to and also UG has as much to lose as the rest of us if they withdraw.

I think UG is pulling its weight on UNSC,thus telling them:You know how important
I am in sorting the mess in Som which everyone is shy of touching,keep of my affairs,or go slow on my affairs,or watch what u say or what rummour you peddle else ...In the process,
though UN/AMISON foots the bill in Som ,they don't have a free hand to be flippant.

ole Nkarei wrote:I stand to be corrected by our Ugandan Brigade - Aggressor One, Flying Crane, Soartan, etc.. When the LRA was "internationalized" and allowed to operate with substantial freedom outside Uganda, the entire game changed. Inside Uganda it was always possible to annihilate the LRA.

Anyone who has ever been to what is now apparently Joseph Tony's operating theater will have not one doubt the enormity of the task of finding and neutralizing him - a terrain of such hostility it drives you crazy after a week of continuous deployment.

Then add to the fact that Kony has a mere company-size of fighters left, who have grown up learning survival and practicing survival in this terrain every minute of their lives. He has strewn his men over an expansive area crossing into several countries and in tactical sizes of five men living off this land. And has terrorized host community that in consequence integrate Kony and his men.

The man has modern comms supplied by Western Conglomerates and their agents who deal in the international commodities market who have activate and supported Kony over the years.

Kony avoids armed contact like the plague, going to ground and staying down. He pillages and loots, killing his way across this vast terrain, pryng on the ethnic tensions prevalent in these simple tribes.

As the Americans have discovered, this Joseph Kony mambo is one very complex conundrum. Don't be too hasty to vilify ongoing initiatives against Kony.

The LRA did not leave Uganda to go to CAR on hoilday. He was actually defeated thoroughly, in otherwards, i do not agree with analyist that Uganda failed to defeat the LRA.

Secondly, Kony`s fighters have got immense experience in the environment that they are working in. I have been to the CAR several times and as you fly from Southern Sudan at Nzara to the CAR you see nothing but very thick forests and rivers. I have been fortunate to go on patrol with the 'jungle units' inside these forests and the deeper you go, the more clearer you realize why Kony is difficult to find. The forests are so thick that in some instances, visibility is near to zero. The entire region of over 1,000 square kilometeres of thick forests has got no road net work. As a result, troops depend on helicopters for both supplies, troop movements from position A-Z, medical evacuations etc. In fact UPDFAF has over 6 choppers deployed in CAR for facilitating these troops. In many instances, these supplies are dropped from the air into the forests with the squads on the ground using GPS to pin point their locations with the choppers.

Secondly, these forests are rich in natural foods, including fruits and root crops like yams. These, coupled by the fish from rivers like Mboom give Kony all the food that he needs.

We also have to realize that the LRA are a very experienced fighting force. In fact, in most of the engagements they have gone in with all the troops accross this region save for the UPDF, they have come out on top. You can talk about their engagements with the SPLA, the FARDC (DRc army), the Sudan Army, the CAR army and above all, the special US trained commandos from Uruguay who were sent in to 'capture' kony in Garamba in 2008. Only the UPDF has been able to handle Kony successfully. It is a difficult task to find him, but one day we shall get our man.

Analyst wrote:Why Museveni is threatening to pull his troops out of Somalia is something that will manifest soon. UNDP_UNMSOA has it's audit on AMISOM progress in Somalia.

M23 and Kony besides the significant love the West had for Museveni may herald a new frontier for sabotage of AMISOM gains.

Museveni may not have understood how the West is good at playing roulette and toss you to the gutter when your services are nolonger needed.

Another issue is the lack of positive reviews about Uganda's efforts in Somalia by UNSC besides relevant authorities including international media.

The fall of Kismayu which was supposed to be a joint operation and it's geopolitical impact/media hype only obscures UPDF hard work.

Museveni is aware of the AMISOM mandate ends in days and having started it; bears the greatest responsibility in ensuring his troops have procured the desired results based on their initial principal objective.
However alot of wheeldealing is in progress and soon Museveni will be happy.
Somalia needs stability and UPDF has a responsibility to complete their mission in Somalia.

How does the fall of Kismayu obscure UPDF`s work? And please don`t answer this question by blubbing about strategy this or strategy that. OK.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html

About $1.4 billion in construction projects are on the drawing board, including a huge new compound that could house up to 1,100 Special Operations forces, more than triple the current number.

Camp Lemonnier is the centerpiece of an expanding constellation of half a dozen U.S. drone and surveillance bases in Africa, created to combat a new generation of terrorist groups across the continent, from Mali to Libya to the Central African Republic.

In an Aug. 20 letter to Congress explaining the emergency contract, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter said that 16 drones and four fighter jets take off or land at the Djibouti airfield each day, on average. Those operations are expected to increase, he added, without giving details.

HokumA wrote:

CH-46
Cost: $6 million as of 1987

I wonder if the economists in the house can calculate the equivalent cost in current terms...

areba wrote:

HokumA wrote:

CH-46
Cost: $6 million as of 1987

I wonder if the economists in the house can calculate the equivalent cost in current terms...

Considering the dollar then was exchanging at about Ksh30 that was Ksh 180,000,000 then.Today with the inflation & possible advances in technology the cost could be well over Ksh 0.8B all factors kept constant. But over time some goods' prices fall after better choices are available in the market.thats my take

I would not use "our" inflation, it has to be the worth of the dollar to them then, vs the worth of the dollar to them now...

mchoraji wrote:

areba wrote:

HokumA wrote:

CH-46
Cost: $6 million as of 1987

I wonder if the economists in the house can calculate the equivalent cost in current terms...

Considering the dollar then was exchanging at about Ksh30 that was Ksh 180,000,000 then.Today with the inflation & possible advances in technology the cost could be well over Ksh 0.8B all factors kept constant. But over time some goods' prices fall after better choices are available in the market.thats my take

Maybe, we should look at the price of the Seahawk that is replacing the Seaknights. Apparently, the latter are being retired by Sammy in large numbers having covered more hours than was ever intended. Anyone knowif the Seaknights are still in production anywhere?

If Museveni pulls out, it may be advantageous to us, because the new president will have a lot of issues to deal with, while we clean up our house in Sector 2. We will have a freer hand in establishing a buffer zone, and our goal of a buffer zone, will be more achievable - that's if the govt doesn't transfer the capital to kismayu

Nesta wrote:If Museveni pulls out, it may be advantageous to us, because the new president will have a lot of issues to deal with, while we clean up our house in Sector 2. We will have a freer hand in establishing a buffer zone, and our goal of a buffer zone, will be more achievable - that's if the govt doesn't transfer the capital to kismayu

I do not think M7 will actually pull out of Soomaaliya. Nevertheless, he is very upset with the UNSC for that report.

The bigger scheme might be an attempt to clip his wings so that the DRC stabilisation idea he is spearheading can be stillborn. Essentially, they may be aiming at ensuring he has no leg to stand on in the push for a Neutral Stabilisation Force for eastern DRC. Of course, the UN mandarins want to maintain MONUSC, notwithstanding its lackluster performance.